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It has long been hypothesized that lack of access to credit is the main reason 
why, despite higher profitability of High Yielding Varieties (HYVs), farmers in 
developing countries continue to allocate a portion of their land to traditional crop 
varieties. The empirical testing of this hypothesis has generated a large body of 
literature with differing conclusions. This paper re-examines the issue in the context 
of a specially designed group based lending programs for small farmers in 
Bangladesh, who neither have access to formal sources of credit nor do they qualify to 
become members of other micro-credit organizations. Two measures of access to 
credit, credit limit and amount borrowed at a given point in time, are used to analyze 
the determinants of farm households￿ land allocation decision. Under a variety of 
model specifications, formulated within Heckman￿s two-step method, the results 
show that credit limits from the lending programs and informal sources are significant 
determinants of small farmers￿ decision to cultivate HYV. 
 
JEL Classification: D13; C25; O16. 
Key Words:  Micro-credit programs, Access to Credit, Credit Limit, Land Allocation Decision, 
Selection Bias, Bangladesh.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Despite significant expansion in institutional credit provision to agriculture, 
and the remarkable success of micro-credit institutions in recent years, small farmers 
in Bangladesh and elsewhere in South Asia continue to lack access to financial 
markets
4. They neither have access to formal institutional credit nor do they generally 
qualify to participate in the micro-lending institutions, administered by the non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). The empirical evidence on limited access to 
formal credit by small farmers is overwhelming (see, for example, Lipton 1976; 
Gonjalez-Vega 1984; Khalili and Meyer 1993, Binswanger and Khandker 1995). On 
the other hand, since micro-lending programs target women and the poorest section of 
the population, small farmers are often screened out through eligibility restrictions, 
such as those requiring that the households be female headed or own less than 0.50 
acres of land
5.  
                                                           
1 Post Doctoral Fellow, Markets and Structural Studies Division, International Food Policy Research 
Institute. 
2 Research Fellow, Food Consumption and Nutrition Division, International Food Policy Research 
Institute. 
3 Chair Professor, Socio-economics of Rural Development, University of Gottingen, Germany. 
4 For a review of limited access to credit by small farmers in Bangladesh, see Sen (2000); for India, see 
Binswanger and Khandker (1995); for a broad review in the context of South Asia, see Faruqee and 
Carey (1997).  
5 Both of these eligibility conditions are commonly practiced by the micro-lending organizations in 
Bangladesh.  
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However, there are some scattered initiatives to extend financial services to 
small and marginal farmers in Bangladesh
6. The Marginal and Small Farm Crop 
Intensification Project, funded by the German Agency for Technical Cooperation 
(GTZ) and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), is one of 
them.  In terms of both eligibility conditions and operational structure, this program 
differs significantly from other micro-lending institutions in the country. Farmers 
owning up to 1.5 acres of land, which roughly fits the definition of small farmers in 
Bangladesh, can join the program and, unlike other micro-lending operations, its 
members conduct banking transactions directly with a commercial bank. A local 
NGO, called Rangpur Dinajpur Development Services (RDRS), acts as a facilitator 
and is responsible for forming farmer groups, providing them with training, and 
finally linking them with a commercial bank to conduct banking transactions. 
Therefore, in addition to credit, this program brings small farmers closer to the formal 
banking system, which has been a long-standing policy challenge in the country.  
  This paper examines whether access to credit through this innovative program 
has significantly altered farm households￿ decision to cultivate high yielding varieties 
(HYVs) of rice. In particular, it investigates the significance of access to credit in 
explaining why, despite higher profitability, farmers in developing countries continue 
to allocate a portion of their land to traditional crop varieties. There are a number of 
competing microeconomic theories to explain this observed behavior of farm 
households. One of the theories, known as input fixity, is based on the argument that if 
farmers are credit constrained, inputs that are considered variable (such as labor, 
                                                           
6 The Hortex Foundation, a pilot project of the Ministry of Agriculture, Government of Bangladesh, is 
also experimenting with similar ideas as part its effort to promote export of horticultural crops.  
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fertilizer, and pesticides) may actually be quasi-fixed in the short run
7. Therefore, if 
traditional varieties outperform modern varieties at low levels of input use, a credit-
constrained farmer may choose to cultivate both traditional and modern crop varieties.  
The concept of a credit limit,
8 defined as the amount of credit that a farm 
household is able to borrow if needed, is used as a measure of access to credit. This 
concept is significantly different from commonly used measures of access to credit, 
such as amount borrowed at a given point in time. For example, suppose a researcher 
observes that the amount-borrowed by a farmer at the time of interview is equal to 
zero. Without further information, one can draw two very different implications from 
this observation. It can imply either that the farmer wanted credit but did not get any 
(i.e., lacked access to credit) or that the farmer did not need any credit. By contrast, if 
credit limit is observed to be zero, one can unambiguously conclude that the farmer 
lacked access to credit. The household survey data used for this study contains 
detailed information on both measures of access to credit, enabling us to empirically 
test how the two measures differ in explaining farm households￿ land allocation 
decisions in rural Bangladesh.  
                                                           
7 Other major theories include: portfolio selection, safety first, and farmer experimentation. As Smale, 
Just, and Leathers (1994) point out, it is likely that other theoretical explanations are nested within a 
general model. However, as we have argued in section II, such concerns are minimal for the sample we 
have studied.   
8 Asking households about their credit limits presents pitfalls. First, credit limit depends on the price 
borrowers are willing to pay for credit, and the interest rate borrowers are willing to pay depends on 
the potential payoff of the project they intend to finance.  Second, those who have borrowed close to 
their credit limits (at any given interest rate) or have actually hit it are likely to have a better knowledge 
of their credit limits than those who do not. However, credit limits in many NGO credit programs are 
well publicized and are set under clear-cut institutional rules, and borrowers or prospective borrowers 
know quite accurately the maximum they can borrow at a known, constant interest rate. Hence, 
extracting quite accurate formal credit limits from households in program villages is possible. This is 




  Under a variety of model specifications within Heckman￿s two-step framework, 
our results suggest that access to credit, defined as credit limits from lending 
institutions and informal sources, is a significant determinant of farm households￿ 
decision to allocate land to HYV. On the other hand, when amount-borrowed is 
considered to be an indicator of access to credit; micro-lending becomes an 
insignificant determinant of HYV cultivation. This implies that if access to credit is 
assumed to be the same as the amount that a household has borrowed at a given time, 
there are potentials for drawing misleading conclusions about the role of credit. The 
remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a 
description of data and study setting, which is followed by a formal description of the 
econometric models. The estimation methods and underlying assumptions are 
outlined in section IV. Results of the econometric models, as well some descriptive 
statistics on key variables, are discussed in section V. The paper concludes with a 
summary of the analyses and potential implications for policies. 
2.  DATA AND STUDY SETTING 
 
  The data set used in this study comes from a household survey conducted by 
the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) during 1994 ￿1995, under its 
multi-country research program titled, Rural Finance and Food Security. Using a 
multi-stage sampling method, seven survey villages were selected from five different 
geographic locations (Thana or Sub-district) in such a way that each village had at 
least one of the following micro-lending programs: Rangpur Dinajpur Rural 
Development Services (RDRS), Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), 
Association of Social Advancement (ASA).   
  5
  Instead of attempting wider coverage and larger sample, the survey was carried 
out with 350 households in a closely supervised environment to ensure quality of 
data. While selection of survey villages was random, selection of households was 
choice-based, i.e., members of RDRS, ASA, and BRAC were over sampled. In order 
to capture seasonal variations in income, consumption, and indebtedness, the survey 
was conducted in three rounds covering a period of 13 months from January 1994 to 
January 1995.  Thus it contains data for all three cropping seasons in Bangladesh, 
namely Aman (crop harvested during November-December), Aus (crop harvested 
during July-August), and Boro (crop harvested during April-May)
 9.  
Data for the Boro season of 1994 have been used in this analysis. Selection of 
this agricultural season is motivated by two factors. First, agricultural activities during 
the other two seasons are highly weather dependent. In particular, HYV cultivation 
decisions during those cropping seasons are critically determined by whether land 
elevation is sufficient enough to avoid flooding and water logging. In fact, in low-
lying lands, which constitute significant portion of the total cultivable lands in some 
districts, HYV cultivation is not even an option during these seasons. This suggests 
that analyzing determinants of HYV cultivation without detailed data on land 
characteristics, as many past studies have done, can be seriously misleading. By 
contrast, Boro cultivation relies almost entirely on mechanical irrigation and the 
probability of flooding is also very low. Thus the analysis can be carried out without 
data on land elevation and other land characteristics. 
Second, using data for the Boro season enables us to consider the theory of 
Input Fixity as a single maintained hypothesis.  As Smale, et. al. (1994) point out, it is  
                                                           
9 For a detailed description of the sampling methodology, see Zeller et. al (2001).  
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likely that other theoretical explanations (such as portfolio selection and farmers￿ 
experimentation) are nested within a general model. That is, a combination of theories 
can provide a better explanation why the farmers allocate their land to various crop 
varieties. Considering the agro-climatic conditions and availability of indigenous crop 
varieties, this argument is readily applicable for Aman and Aus seasons. By contrast, 
as farmers can reduce risks by cultivating traditional and modern varieties, assuming 
high profitability of HYV and availability of irrigation, it can be safely assumed that 
farmers cannot reduce overall risks by choosing a portfolio of crops during the Boro 
season.
10 Therefore, the concerns for theories being nested within a general model 
should be minimal.     
Another data-related issue deserves some explanations. The organization and 
operational structure of the micro-lending programs surveyed for this study are 
different. While both BRAC and ASA operate under similar organizational 
frameworks, with the main objective of serving households owning less than 0.50 
acres of land, RDRS focuses on small and marginal farmers, who own up to 1.5 acres 
of land. Moreover, unlike ASA and BRAC, RDRS does not manage its members￿ 
fund. Instead, after receiving training, RDRS members transact directly with the 
nationalized commercial banks at prevailing market interest rates. Our initial 
objective was to carry out the analysis exclusively with the sample of RDRS 
members, but due to the insufficiency of degrees of freedom (small sample), ASA and 
BRAC members, who cultivated more than one acre of land (own plus rented), are 
also included to implement the empirical methodology. As a result, there is a 
                                                           
10Profitability of HYV is well documented in Bangladesh. According to Hossain (1988), while cost of 
production per acre is about 40% higher, profits per acre of HYV is almost 2.5 times more than per 
acre profit from local varieties. Thus higher profitability at all net return ranges can be assumed safely, 
which is an additional condition necessary to rule out portfolio selection theory being nested.  
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likelihood of downward bias in the regression coefficients, especially the ones 
measuring the credit impacts. 
 
3.  THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
  The paper attempts to model two household decisions: (i) the decision to 
participate in the micro-lending programs and (ii) the decision to cultivate modern 
rice variety. The second decision can be further disaggregated. For example, the 
farmers may first decide whether to adopt the technology and then, all else constant, 
decide how much land to allocate to HYV. These decisions can be defined as 
propensity to adopt and intensity to adopt
11   respectively.  Formally, suppose that 
∗ A and 
∗ C  are two latent variables determining adoption of HYV and participation 
in one of the micro-lending programs. If H denotes the amount of land allocated to 
HYV, the full model can be outlined by the following set of equations:  
i i i i u C X A 1 2 1 1 0 + + ′ + =
∗ α α α                (1) 
i i i u X C 2 1 2 0 + ′ + =
∗ β β       (2) 
i i i i u C X H 3 2 1 0 + + + = δ δ δ ;    if ( ) CA ii
** , >> 00      (3a) 
           i i u X 3 1
’
0 + + = δ δ  ;  if ( ) 0 , 0
* * > ≤ i i A C      (3b) 
           = 0 otherwise.                (3c) 
Where  Xi is a vector that, in addition to household specific characteristics and 
regional dummies, includes credit limit (amount-borrowed) from informal sources, Ci  
                                                           
11 Hossain (1988) treated these two decisions as independent and estimated a probit model for first 
stage decision and a Tobit model for the second stage decision. However, as variables that affect first 
stage decision can also affect second stage decision, error terms of the two equations are likely to be 
correlated.  
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represents credit limit (amount-borrowed) from micro-lending institutions in natural 
logarithms, and  s ui’ are error terms.  
  The primary interest of this analysis is in equation 3(a), which specifies the 
amount of land allocated to HYV by adopter-cum-member farmers. Estimation is 
carried out in two stages. In the first stage, the joint probability of joining lending 
institutions and adopting HYV is estimated through reduced form specifications of 
equations (1) and (2). In the second stage, equation 3(a) is estimated with inverse 
mills ratios included as explanatory variables. That is, our final estimating equation 
can be specified as, 
    ) 0 , 0 | ( ) 0 , 0 | ( 3 2 1 0 > > + + + = > >
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ C A u E C X C A H E i i i i δ δ δ          (4) 
Assuming the normality of  , , 2 1 i i u u  and  i u3 , equation (4) can be re-written as, 
  i i i i i C X C A H E 2 23 1 13 2 1 0 ) 0 , 0 | ( λ σ λ σ δ δ δ + + + + = > >
∗ ∗                      (5) 
where  i 1 λ and  i 2 λ are inverse mills ratios expressed by
12  
   () () ( ) [ ] () ( ) 12 2 1 1
2
12 2 12 1 1 , , 1 ρ β α α φ ρ β ρ α λ i i i i i i Z Z Z Z Z ′ ′ Φ ′ ⋅ − ′ − ′ Φ =  
  () () ( ) [ ] () ( ) 12 2 1 2
2
12 1 12 2 2 , , 1 ρ β α α φ ρ β ρ α λ i i i i i i Z Z Z Z Z ′ ′ Φ ′ ⋅ − ′ − ′ Φ = , 
and 
    [] [ ] i i i i i C X Z X Z 2 2 1 1 1 , 1 = = , 
      [] , 2 1 0
′ = α α α α      [] ′ = 1 0 β β β . 
The inverse mills ratios,  i 1 λ and  i 2 λ , are estimated by a bivariate probit estimation 
method applied to equation (1) and (2). In an intermediate step, predicted values of 
formal and informal credit limits (and amount-borrowed) are estimated through a  
                                                           
12 The expressions for  i 1 λ and  i 2 λ are derived in Kochar (1997).   
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generalized Tobit method, which are used as instruments to control for the 
endogeneity of credit in the equation determining land allocation to HYV, i.e., 
equation (5).
13  
  The general analytical framework outlined above is very flexible in terms of 
testing hypotheses under various assumptions about the error terms and access to 
credit. In particular, in addition to controlling for selectivity problem, this formulation 
allows testing the null hypothesis that decisions to adopt HYV and obtaining credit 
are jointly determined against the alternative that two decisions are independent. 
Furthermore, with these features incorporated, this analytical framework is able to 
address some of the econometric shortcomings of past empirical research on credit 
and HYV in Bangladesh. 
   For example, one of the most cited studies in Bangladesh, Hossain (1988), uses 
a Probit model to assess determinants of HYV adoption decisions and finds both 
formal and informal credit to be insignificant. However, using a Tobit specification, 
with proportion of land allocated to HYV as the dependent variable, the same study 
finds a significant relationship between credit and lands cultivated with HYVs.  
  There are two econometric problems in Hossain￿s methodology. First, his 
analytical method treats credit as exogenous variable, which can potentially generate 
inconsistent parameter estimates
14.  This paper addresses the problem by 
instrumenting credit with the predicted values, estimated with a generalized Tobit 
specification. Second, although a Tobit model controls for the censoring, it ignores  
                                                           
13 Predicted values of credit limits are estimated using a generalized Tobit model. For a discussion on 
this methodology, see Amemiya (1986). 
14 This follows from the fact that obtaining credit is within the domain of households￿ choice and hence 
should be considered endogenous.  
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the self-selection bias arising from the farmers￿ decision to adopt HYV. This is 
similar to a common issue addressed in empirical labor economics, where the earning 
equation is estimated for those who actually work and earns an income. To draw the 
analogy, HYV is observed only if a farmer decides to adopt, just like earning is 
observed only if a worker decides to work. 
 
4.  ESTIMATION METHOD 
 
 
  The actual estimations are carried out in a sequential method that broadly 
involves three steps: i) estimation of a generalized Tobit specification to predict the 
probability of borrowing and loan amount, ii) estimation of reduced form probit 
models to determine the joint probability of adopting HYV and obtaining credit from 
one of the lending institutions, and iii) estimation of equation 5 by Instrumental 
Variable (IV) with s i’ λ and predicted credit amount as instruments. Note that, while 
estimations of first two steps are carried out with entire sample, step iii is based on the 
sample of adopter-cum-borrower households only.  Household specific variables 
included in each stage of estimation￿such as family size, age of the household head, 
highest level of education, ownership of land, etc.￿are standard in micro-
econometric analyses of household survey data. For example, in analyzing various 
impacts of micro-lending in Bangladesh, Pitt and Khandker (1998) and Morduch 
(1998) have used similar set of variables.   
  Depending on the assumptions about error terms and access to credit, four 
different specifications of the general model have been estimated. The first 
specification is based on the assumption that error terms in equations (1) and (2) are 
un-correlated and that the credit limit is the indicator of access to credit. The  
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assumption of uncorrelated error terms imply that the inverse mills ratios,  i 1 λ and 
i 2 λ , can be estimated through an equation-by-equation probit regression. In the 
second stage, these inverse mills ratios along with credit limit and other household 
specific variables are included as explanatory variables.  
  One of the weaknesses of the above specification, however, is that it treats 
HYV adoption and borrowing as two independent decisions, which seems intuitively 
unrealistic as the set of variables that affect HYV adoption may also affect program 
participation and borrowing decisions. Statistically, this implies that the error terms of 
the first-stage probit equations are correlated and, if such assumption holds true, 
computing  s ’ λ through equation-by-equation probit method will lead to inconsistent 
parameter estimates (Kochar 1997). In order to address this issue, the second 
specification of the model allows error terms of equations 1 and 2 to be correlated, but 
continues to assume credit limit as the measure of access to credit. In terms of 
estimation, the main difference between the two specifications is that the first stage 
probit equations are now estimated using Full Information Maximum Likelihood 
(FIML) method, instead of an equation-by-equation bivariate probit method.   
  Finally, to compare how the two measures of access to credit differ, the 
explanatory variable credit limit is replaced by amount-borrowed in the next two sets 
of regressions. Note that all other explanatory variables are identical to the previous 
specifications.  Again, depending on the assumption about error terms in the probit 
equations, two different models are estimated. Notice that the results of these 
specifications, presented in Table 4, are in sharp contrast to the results reported in 
Table 3.   
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5.  DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
  While the focus of the study is on econometric analysis, some descriptive 
analyses have also been carried out in order to demonstrate how the sampled 
households differ in terms of key resource endowment and membership to various 
lending organizations
15. The weighted means and standard deviations, reported in 
Table 1, clearly indicate that land allocation to HYV varies considerably by both farm 
size and whether or not households belong to one of the lending institutions. The 
proportion of irrigated land allocated to HYV varies within a range of 49 to 80 
percent, with the lowest proportion corresponding to the poorest group of households. 
Among the poorest group of households, member households allocate 21 percent 
more land to HYV than non-members. For the other two land ownership groups, the 
differences in HYV land between member and non-member households are 9 percent 
and 11 percent respectively.  
  The other significant crops cultivated in irrigated land are local variety of Boro 
rice, wheat, and locally improved rice varieties. To check the reliability of the survey 
data, we have computed the mean proportion of land allocated to these crops from the 
national level data published by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS). As Table 
2 shows, for three out of four survey districts, the descriptive results are in close 
proximity to nationally published statistics for 1994, the year this survey was 
conducted. The only exception is Sylhet district, where the national statistics of HYV 
as a proportion of irrigated land is substantially lower than estimates from the survey  
data. This apparent inconsistency is due to the fact that a large part of this district is  
                                                           
15These descriptive statistics are based on the households that had access to irrigation.  
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low-lying land (called HAOR), where water level increases during the Boro crop 
harvesting. As a result, because of its longer stem and more resilience to climatic 
adversities, local variety of rice is more suitable than modern HYV (Bera and Kelly 
1990). Since our survey villages in this district were not in the HAOR area, proportion 
of HYV is naturally much higher than the district level average.  
  Before discussing the regression results, some general comments need to be 
made about potential inferential problems of including informal credit into the model.  
As Bell (1993) points out, access to formal credit may improve the likelihood of 
obtaining credit from the informal sources and hence formal and informal credit may 
be correlated. As joining one of the lending programs increases the probability of 
getting credit from informal sources, similar logic may be applicable for our sample. 
However, due to resulting omitted variable bias, exclusion of informal credit from the 
model is not a straightforward option in this analytical framework. In fact, as 
Davidson et al. (1978) point out, such exclusion can actually worsen the precision in 
the remaining explanatory variables, even when two variables are highly correlated. 
Therefore, despite potential collinearity, informal credit is also included into the 
model. 14 
Table 1￿Weighted Means and Standard Deviations of Selected Variables by 
Land Holding and by Group membership. 
 
Land Variables  Member  Household 
Non-member 
Household 
Holding     Mean  Std. Dev  Mean  Std. Dev. 
(in decimals) 
  
 Area  cultivated  20.79  13.70  29.09  10.74 
  Total irrigated land  27.31  17.68  48.20  46.09 
0.0 - 50.0  Amount of land allocated to HYV  16.31  13.58  17.61  14.43 
  HYV land as a proportion of          
 Irrigated  land.  0.68  0.44  0.49  0.36 
            
 Area  cultivated  81.89  16.02  95.31  25.06 
  Total irrigated land  71.30  35.48  97.19  60.42 
51.0 - 150.0  Amount of land allocated to HYV  51.61  27.25  60.92  32.20 
  HYV land as a proportion of          
 Irrigated  land.  0.80  0.29  0.71  0.31 
             
 Area  cultivated  188.55 35.46  196.11  29.19 
  Total irrigated land  196.51 110.42  181.59  106.2 
151.0 - 250.0  Amount of land allocated to HYV  141.41   64.71  117.36  71.71 
  HYV land as a proportion of          
 Irrigated  land.  0.80  0.24  0.69  0.34 
              
  Area cultivated       292.39   25.47 
  Total irrigated land       215.43  164.35 
251.0 - 350.0  Amount of land allocated to HYV       118.44  164.35 
  HYV land as a proportion of           
  Irrigated land.       .54  .32 
              
  Area cultivated       466.86  180.08 
  Total irrigable land       403.64  212.55 
350 +  Amount of land allocated to HYV       228.58   99.17 
  HYV land as a proportion of           
  Irrigated land.       0.64  0.24 
 
Source: Authors￿ computation based on IFPRI household survey 1994-95.  
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Table 2￿Comparison of Survey Data with Nationally Published Statistics 
 
  Proportion of Land Allocated to HYV 
Districts  Survey Data*  National Statistics** 
 Mean  Standard  Deviation  Mean 
Dhaka 0.723  0.340  0.72 
Mymansingh 0.573  0.356  0.70 
Rangpur 0.611  0.319  0.62 
Sylhet 0.794  0.353  0.30 
 
*   Author￿s calculation from IFPRI household survey 1994-95.  
**  Based on the data from the Bangladesh Statistical Yearbook for 1995. 
 
  Following the specifications of the previous sections, four sets of regression 
results are reported. Results of the specification that considers credit limit as the 
measure of access to credit is presented in Tables 3, where two columns of results are 
derived under the assumptions of correlated and uncorrelated error terms (in the 
probit equations) respectively. In other words, while the first column of the table 
hypothesizes decisions to adopt and decision to borrow to be interrelated; the other 
column treats two decisions as independent.  Note that, although at different level of 
significance, both formal and informal credit limits are significant under these 
specifications. However, when decisions to adopt and decision to participate in 
lending program are treated independently, both the magnitude of the estimated 
coefficients and their significance levels decrease substantially. In particular, in 
addition to a 15 percent decrease in the estimated coefficient, formal credit limit 
becomes insignificant at five percent level of significance.     16
Table 3￿Credit Limit As a Determinant of Farmer￿s Decision to Cultivate HYV  
 
Regression results
a   
Explanatory 
Variables 
HYV adoption decision and credit 
program participation decision 
interacted 
HYV adoption decision and 
credit program participation 
decision are independent 








Age of the household head squared  0.031 
(0.95) 
  0.049 
(1.57) 
Total own land    0.713* 
(1.66) 
     0.646** 
(2.23) 
Total irrigated land***     0.366** 
(3.96) 
     0.347** 
(4.30) 
Total number of household members    -11.739** 
(-2.54) 
  -12.691** 
(-3.52) 
Highest grade completed by male member    5.827** 
(2.32) 
  0.477 
(0.19) 








Dummy for geographic region 1  -6.729 
(-0.60) 
  6.751 
(0.72) 
Dummy for geographic region 2  15.240 
(1.06) 
   58.159** 
(2.79) 
Dummy for geographic region 3  10.323 
(0.81) 
  27.336* 
(1.93) 




Natural log of Informal credit limit  (×
2 10
− )     0.089** 
(2.08) 
  0.095** 
(2.44) 
Natural log of Formal credit limit    (×
2 10
− )  0.290** 
(2.20) 
  0.249* 
(1.72) 




Lambda-B (mills ratio from PROGRAM 
                       Participation equation) 
 -69.422* 
(-1.77) 
  -89.052** 
(-2.65) 
Diagnostics
b    
Log likelihood  -141.05  -137.59 
Restricted Log likelihood    -202.07 
Sample size  202  202 
Adjusted R
2  0.871 0.89
 
 
Source: IFPRI household survey data 1994-95. 
a Asymptotic t-ratios in parenthesis. 
b Note that for the estimation method employed, R
2  is not bounded between o and 1.  Also, since it 
remains same for all regressions, sample size is not reported with other results. 
*  Coefficients are significant at less than 10% level of significance 
** Coefficients are significant at less than 5% level of significance 
*** Irrigated land refers to mechanically irrigated land in all specifications and is measured in decimal 
(i.e., 1/100
th of an acre).  
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  While credit variables are found significant, elasticities based on the regression 
estimates suggest that the responsiveness of farmer￿s HYV cultivation with respect to 
credit is low and becomes increasingly lower as land holding increases. For example, 
the estimated elasticity of HYV cultivation to credit limit for households owning less 
than 0.50 acres of land is estimated at 0.02; whereas the same estimate for the 
households owning more than one acre of land is only 0.002, implying that smaller 
farmers will derive the most benefit from credit services.
16 Given profitability from 
HYV is twice as high according to existing estimates, it follows that, by enabling 
small farmers to make profitable investment, credit programs can have significant 
beneficial impacts in terms of productivity growth and overall household well being.  
  Table 4 reports the results of the specification that assumes amount-borrowed 
as a measure of access to credit. Note that these results stand in sharp contrast to the 
results presented in Tables 3. In particular, amount-borrowed from lending programs 
now becomes highly insignificant, although loan from informal sources remains 
significant at 10 percent level of significance. Within our methodological framework, 
this result has a simple explanation.  Although some households had membership in 
lending programs, they either borrowed less than their credit limit or did not borrow 
at all at the time of interview. In other words, while credit limit always received a 
positive value, amount-borrowed was reported either zero or a value that is less than 
the credit limit of the households. These differences between the two measures of  
    
 
                                                           
16 These elasticity estimates are based on the regression estimates of Table 3 and mean HYV land, 
reported in Table 1. For example, household owning less than 0.50 acres of land allocated 0.163 acres 
of land (table 1) and the estimated coefficient for credit limit is 0.29x10
-2. Therefore, for this group of 
households,  02 .
163 . 0
0029 .







ε .   
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a   
Explanatory 
Variables 
Decision to adopt HYV￿s and 
decision to join credit program are 
interacted 
Decision to adopt HYV￿s and 
decision to join credit program 
are independent 








































Dummy for geographic region 2  25.116* 
(1.67) 
  61.856** 
(2.68) 
Dummy for geographic region 3  18.211 
(1.30) 
  30.775** 
(1.96) 












Natural log of amount borrowed from formal 















   -84.020** 
(-2.25) 
                       
Diagnostics
b    
Log likelihood  -143.41  -140.540 
Restricted Log likelihood     
Adjusted R
2  0.841 0.849 
 
Source: IFPRI household survey data 1994-95. 
a Asymptotic t-ratios in parenthesis. 
* Coefficients are significant at less than 10% level of significance 
** Coefficients are significant at less than 5% level of significance    19
access to credit might have caused the coefficient of amount-borrowed from lending 
institutions to be insignificant. 
 On the other hand, the significance of informal credit under both 
specifications implies that the adopter-cum-member households have borrowed close 
to their credit limit, which is, of course, a special case in which credit limit and 
amount-borrowed are close to each other. One might ask is: why did households 
borrow from expensive informal sources when they had access to micro-lending? The 
answer lies in the fact that most of these loans are from friends and relatives and not 
as expensive as loans taken from the moneylenders. It is, however, not clear whether 
the same households would have obtained such informal credit if they had not joined 
one of the lending programs. As Bell (1993) argues, costs of informal credit may 
significantly depend on whether or not a household has access to formal credit. 
Therefore, significance of informal credit in this analysis should be partly attributed 
to households￿ access to lending programs. 
  Although the primary focus of the analysis has been on the relationship 
between land allocation and credit, the estimated parameters associated with the other 
explanatory variables also bear important implications. Two sets of estimates are of 
particular interest. First, mills ratios  ) ’ ( s λ related to program participation equation 
are significant in three out of four models considered. This implies that failure to 
control of selection bias would have led to inconsistent parameter estimates.
17 
Second, three household specific variables￿irrigated land, household size, and 
gender of the household head￿are found significant under all four specifications of 
                                                           
17 Other econometric implications of selection problems are well described in Green (1993),  
pp. 706-714.   
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the model. Since irrigation is a prerequisite for HYV cultivation, it is expected that 
the coefficient associated with it would be significant.  
  The significant negative relationship of family size and gender of the household 
head, however, may seem counter-intuitive at first sight. As cultivation of HYV 
requires more supervision, it is usually hypothesized that male-headed households 
would allocate more land to HYV i.e., the coefficient of gender dummy should be 
positive. In our analysis, the negative sign of the gender dummy simply implies that 
more female-headed households join the micro-lending programs; and that although 
some member households are male-headed, they do not allocate as much land to 




6.  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
  Despite high profitability of HYVs, farm households in the developing 
countries continue to allocate a portion of their land to traditional crop varieties. One 
of the micro-theoretic explanations of this observed behavior is that, if traditional 
varieties outperform HYVs at low levels of input use, it is optimal for a credit-
constrained farmer to cultivate the traditional varieties. This paper has attempted to 
examine the issue in the context of a specially designed micro-lending program for 
small farmers in Bangladesh.  
  The concept of a credit limit, defined as the highest amount of credit a 
household is able to borrow if needed, has been used as an indicator of access to 
credit. The underlying idea is that, the investment decision of a farm household is  
                                                           
18 In fact, 90 percent of the participating households in the sample are female-headed.   
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influenced more by how much the household is able to borrow than how much it has 
already borrowed. Results indicate that the impacts of credit on farm households￿ land 
allocation decisions significantly depend on how access to credit is defined. In 
particular, while the credit limit is found to have a significant positive impact on the 
amount of land allocated to HYV, the relationship becomes insignificant when the 
amount-borrowed is considered as a measure of access to credit. This result has a 
simple explanation. In our sample there are member households, who either did not 
borrow or borrowed less than their credit limit at the time of interview. Therefore, 
while credit limit always received a positive value, amount-borrowed was reported as 
either zero or an amount less than the credit limit, which might have caused the 
coefficient of amount-borrowed to be insignificant.  
  Both measures of access to credit, credit limit and amount-borrowed, from 
informal sources are found to be significant determinant of HYV cultivation under all 
model specifications. The relationship, however, becomes weaker when amount-
borrowed is considered to be an indicator of access to credit. Given our empirical 
methodology, this results imply that the adopter-cum-member households have 
borrowed close to their maximum credit limit from the informal sources￿a special 
situation where credit limit and amount-borrowed are not significantly different. 
  The findings of this study hold clear policy implications for Bangladesh. 
Although the country has gained international reputation for its success in micro-
lending programs, the focus of these programs has almost exclusively been on income 
generation through non-farm activities. The majority of small farm households 
continue to rely on the informal sector for their credit needs. They neither have access 
to formal financial sector nor to the micro-lending programs administered by the 
NGOs. This study has presented empirical evidence that there is room to increase  
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agricultural productivity by providing the small farmers with financial services 
through micro-lending institutions. While our focus has been on land allocation to 
HYV, access to micro-lending can also increase the use of other inputs such fertilizer 
and pesticides. As the Small and Marginal Farm Crop Intensification Project of 
RDRS has demonstrated, small farmers can be brought closer to formal banking by 
establishing successful partnerships between NGOs and commercial banks. Such 
initiative will not only increase productivity but also improve the performance of the 
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